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Abstract 
This paper utilizes new reconstructions and projections of populations by age, sex and 
four levels of educational attainment for 120 countries since 1970 for a reassessment of 
the global relationship between improvements in human capital and democracy as 
measured by the Freedom House indicator of political rights. Similar to an earlier study 
on the effects of improving educational attainment on economic growth, the greater age 
detail of this new dataset can resolve earlier ambiguities about the effect of improving 
education as assessed on the basis of a global set of national time series. The results 
show consistently strong positive effects of improving overall levels of educational 
attainment, of a narrowing gender gap in education, and of fertility declines on 
improvements in the democracy indicator. This global relationship is then applied to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Over the past two decades Iran has experienced the world’s 
most rapid fertility decline associated with massive increases in female education. The 
results show that based on the experience of 120 countries since 1970, Iran has a high 
chance of significant improvement towards more democracy over the coming years. 
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Demography, Education and Democracy: Global Trends and the 
Case of Iran 
Wolfgang Lutz, Jesús Crespo Cuaresma, and Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi 
1  Introduction and Background 
In the political science literature, there is a long tradition of studying the drivers of 
improvements in political rights and democracy. The so-called modernization hypothesis (see 
Lipset (1959) for a first systematic account of this theory) considers the level of development 
of a country, and in particular its educational attainment, as the main determinant of the birth 
and sustainability of democratic political institutions. 
The theoretical arguments relating education to democracy are manifold. At the 
individual level, education is a determinant of political participation. As the educational level 
increases, individuals tend to develop a stronger sense of civic duty and a greater interest in 
politics.1 However, to the extent that education causes economic growth, it is an indirect 
determinant of democracy through the presumed link between wealth at the macroeconomic 
level and democracy (see Barro 1996). A further possible mechanism of influence is through 
the effect of female education on fertility and hence changing age structures which has been 
identified as a factor relevant to political stability and governance. Recent political science 
contributions to the theoretical literature on the link between educational attainment and 
democracy emphasize the increase in the benefits of political participation caused by 
education as the catalytic link relating changes in educational measures to changes in 
democracy. Glaeser et al. (2007) present a theoretical model where the effect of education on 
the (otherwise weak) incentives faced by individuals to support democratic regimes leads to 
higher stability of democratic regimes in more educated societies. 
Although fertility decline is an important element of general modernization of 
societies, demographic changes are rarely seen as directly related to the transition to and 
persistence of democracy. The big exception is the literature on the “youth bulge” (see 
Cincotta (2008) for a recent account of the issue) which looks, however, not at the factors 
enhancing democracy, but rather focuses on the possible negative effects of large (male) 
cohorts – which are the result of past high fertility – entering young adulthood and 
presumably bringing instability and possibly even conflict into otherwise stable systems. In 
the “youth bulge” literature, it is not always clear whether such a phenomenon is only to be 
expected if fertility has declined recently – only this would produce a “bulge” – or whether 
continued high fertility would also lead to such a phenomenon. But in any case the focus of 
these studies is on political instability and not on democracy itself. In fact under previously 
authoritarian conditions, such instability of a “youth bulge” may actually lead to conditions 
                                                 
1
 Recent studies show that nonformal education also affects political participation (see Kuenzi (2006) for an 
empirical study about Senegal). Due to data limitations, we will refer only to formal education in the discussion. 
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that favor the introduction of democracy. The Indonesian experience in the 1990s presents a 
point in case for this mechanism (see Keyfitz 1986). Since the focus of the “youth bulge” 
argument is quite different from our interest, we will not further refer to this literature in this 
paper. Instead we will consider changing age distributions as a factor closely interacting with 
a changing distribution of educational attainment by age and sex, and study the impacts of 
changes in both factors in the emergence, improvement and maintenance of democratic 
liberties and rights. 
This paper follows an earlier one (Lutz et al. 2008) in a series of studies utilizing a 
newly reconstructed set of data of educational attainment distributions by sex and five-year 
age groups for 120 countries in the world to re-assess the macro-level returns to education. 
The earlier paper had a fresh look at an important long-standing macroeconomic puzzle 
concerning the relationship between improving educational attainment of the adult population 
and economic growth. While it had been established beyond reasonable doubt that at the 
individual level more education on average leads to higher income, previous cross-country 
economic growth regressions tended to show that changes in educational attainment are 
largely unrelated to economic growth (Barro and Lee 1996; Benhabib and Spiegel 1994; 
Pritchett 2001), which is in contradiction to theory and the micro-econometric evidence. Most 
of the literature in this field attributes the existence of this puzzle to deficiencies in the series 
of education and human capital data (Bloom 2006; de la Fuente and Domenech 2006; Cohen 
and Soto 2007). The new human capital data by age and sex, described briefly in the 
following section, could resolve this puzzle by providing more age detail than was previously 
possible. Earlier studies typically considered the entire adult population 25+ as one age group. 
The average education of this huge age group is very stable and in many developing countries 
recent improvements in education that resulted in rapid increases of the education of the 
younger adult labor force – which tends to be key for economic growth in developing 
countries – are hardly visible in this age group which also includes the largely uneducated 
elderly. A consideration of education distributions by five-year age groups could easily 
resolve this problem and unambiguously demonstrate the consistently positive and significant 
effect of increasing educational attainment on economic growth. 
The analysis presented in this paper uses the new age-specific dataset on human 
capital for cross-country panel regression in which the dependent variable is an indicator of 
democracy instead of economic growth. In addition, this study will also apply the estimated 
global level relationships to the future of one specific country which experienced astonishing 
social transformations over the past years and is currently at the center of international 
attention. 
In the following we will first briefly present and discuss the new set of data by age, 
sex and educational attainment. Next we will look at recent demographic and education trends 
in Iran, the specific national illustration chosen for this paper, and discuss the interplay 
between female education and family planning that resulted in the world’s most rapid fertility 
decline, bringing the total fertility rate (TFR) down from 7.0 in 1980 to 1.9 in 2006. This will 
be followed by a global level econometric analysis of a panel of data assessing the impacts of 
improving male and female education as well as declining fertility and other selected 
variables on changes of the chosen indicator of democratic rights. We will conclude by 
discussing the implications for the likely future of democracy in Iran when applying the 
parameters estimated from the global analysis to population projections by age, sex and level 
of education in Iran. 
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2  Population Dynamics of Improving Educational Attainment 
Demographers tend to study most phenomena by age and sex. But there are other human 
characteristics that show great discriminatory power in explaining differential trends and for 
which good statistical information is available. Education is a prime candidate; it has been 
shown that explicitly considering education as a source of observed heterogeneity can add 
greatly to understanding the forces driving changes in the population. When limiting the 
scope to demographic phenomena, both fertility and mortality are greatly influenced by 
education. The discriminatory power of educational categories as well as the overall influence 
of education on demographic trends is so pervasive that in a contribution entitled 
“Demographic dimensions in forecasting: Adding education to age and sex,” Lutz et al. 
(1999) suggested to give education a status in demography that comes near to that of age and 
sex. As the following description will show, the often raised counterargument, that not 
enough systematic information was available for education as compared to age and sex, does 
not hold. For virtually every country in the world there is enough information from censuses 
and surveys to study the changing educational structure of the population by age and sex. In 
terms of vital events, surveys provide almost complete information on fertility by level of 
education (which is the most important for population dynamics) while the situation is more 
difficult for mortality. It is quite unsatisfactory for migration where often the information by 
age and sex is also lacking. But the collection of demographic information in the future will 
be driven by what demographic scholars and subsequently administrators in official statistics 
consider information that is worthwhile to be collected. In that sense, illustrating the models 
of population dynamics by level of education and demonstrating the overriding importance of 
education will pose an incentive for collecting still better information in the future. 
Following this principle, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA), in collaboration with the Vienna Institute of Demography (VID) of the Austrian 
Academy of Sciences, has recently produced a unique new dataset which applies demographic 
multi-state projection techniques to reconstruct the population by age, sex and level of 
educational attainment from empirical data from around 2000 back to 1970 in five-year steps. 
This has been done for 120 countries, including Iran. While a comprehensive description of 
methods and results is given in Lutz et al. (2007), in the following section we will provide 
only a brief outline of the approach and highlight the results for Iran. The same multi-state 
approach has recently been applied to project the population by levels of educational 
attainment to 2030 for all countries in the world (KC et al. 2008), and the results for Iran are 
included here. 
At any point in time the distribution of the population by age, sex and level of 
educational attainment reflects the history of changes in the proportions of a cohort that 
attended school and reached certain educational levels. Since formal education typically 
happens in childhood and youth, the current educational attainment distribution of 50-54 year 
old women, for instance, reflects education conditions and school enrolment of more than 30 
years ago. This is clearly visible in Figure 1, which shows the educational age pyramid of Iran 
around 2000. The figure gives the usual age pyramid with men on the left and women on the 
right, where shadings indicate a further subdivision for each age group of men and women by 
highest level of educational attainment. The picture clearly indicates that younger Iranians are 
not only much more numerous (due to the history of very high fertility), but also on average 
much better educated than older ones. This recent improvement in educational attainment is 
particularly impressive for women. While more than two-thirds of the young women in Iran 
today have completed at least junior secondary education, among their mothers’ generation 
only a tiny fraction did so. Hence, the history of rapidly increasing education over time is well 
reflected in today’s age pattern of education. 
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Iran - Population by Age, Sex and Educational Attainment in 2000
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Figure 1.  Age and education pyramid for Iran, 2000. 
The back-projection exercise described here utilizes the fact that much of a 
population’s education history is still reflected in its current structure. It goes back along 
cohort lines in five-year steps by deriving, e.g., the proportion without any formal schooling 
among 50-54 year old women in 1995 from that of 55-59 year olds in 2000 (see Figure 2 for 
the pyramid corresponding to 1970). There are only three possible factors that can cause these 
two proportions to differ: differential mortality, differential migration, and women who still 
acquire formal education after the age of 55. While such late educational transitions are 
typically irrelevant, differential mortality is a major issue because there is strong evidence in 
virtually all countries where such data exist that higher educational groups have significantly 
lower levels of mortality, presumably through better access to information, healthier lifestyles 
and better economic standing. Although this issue is mentioned in the economic literature of 
education data, it is not explicitly dealt with in earlier attempts of reconstructing human 
capital data (Barro and Lee 1996; Benhabib and Spiegel 1994). Only demographic multi-state 
methods can appropriately deal with differential vital rates. 
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Iran - Population by Age, Sex and Educational Attainment in 1970
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Figure 2.  Reconstructed age and education pyramid for Iran, 1970. 
Lutz et al. (2007) provide a detailed account of all the specific assumptions that had to 
be made as part of this reconstruction exercise, discuss their plausibility, and provide 
sensitivity analyses. The method can be summarized as follows: First, for every country, an 
empirical distribution of the population by age, sex and four categories of educational 
attainment (no formal education, some primary, completed lower secondary, completed first 
level of tertiary) was retrieved for a year close to 2000. In the case of Iran, the data were taken 
from the 1996 census and projected forward to 2000. Second, we drew on an existing United 
Nations (2005) dataset which provides estimates of the age and sex structure in five-year 
intervals since 1950 for every country in the world. For this reason our effort did not have to 
reconstruct the absolute sizes of the populations by individual age groups, but only the 
proportions with different education levels in each age group of men and women. This also 
made the necessary demographic assumptions a lot easier, since it was not necessary to 
estimate the overall level of mortality or the total volume of migration (which is implicit in 
the UN estimates), but only to consider to what degree these demographic forces differed by 
level of education. While for migration the default assumption was that it did not contribute to 
changing the educational composition of the population, for mortality we assumed a 
consistent pattern that life expectancy at age 15 differs by five years between the lowest and 
the highest educational category (with the difference between no education and some primary 
being one year and the other differences being two years each). This assumption was based on 
an assessment of a selection of countries from different parts of the world for which such data 
exist (see Lutz et al. 2007). 
A further problem arose from the fact that in the empirical data, the oldest age group is 
typically an open-ended category such as 65+ or 70+. When going back along cohort lines, 
those aged 70+ in 2000 are 40+ in 1970. To get information for the closed intervals 40-44 to 
60-64, we need to make assumptions about the distributions across age and education 
categories in these open intervals which were based (unless empirical information was 
available) on exponential trend extrapolation of the proportions in the adjacent closed age 
groups. This source of uncertainty is the reason why it was decided to stop the reconstruction 
in 1970 and not go back further into history, as the assumptions would have become 
progressively more restrictive. Another set of assumptions referred to the ages at which 
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transitions from one educational category to another were made. Since the reconstruction is 
only performed for the population above age 15, this only concerned transitions to tertiary and 
to a lesser extent to the secondary level. Lutz et al. (2007) provide further technical details on 
the reconstruction of the dataset. 
Table 1 provides the numerical output for the reconstruction for Iran. It shows the 
absolute numbers of men and women by five-year age groups and the four levels of 
educational attainment for Iran for 1970, 2000 and 2030. The bottom line of each sub-table 
gives the distribution across educational categories for all adult age groups together; the right-
hand margin gives the summary measure of the average level of education for individual age 
groups in the form of mean years of schooling. Although the estimation of this indicator 
requires additional assumptions in terms of the average years of schooling it takes to become 
a member of a certain educational attainment category, it was decided to provide it in order to 
facilitate a comparison to other datasets that only provide mean years of schooling. Finally, 
the number in the lower right corner of each matrix gives the mean year of schooling for the 
entire adult population above age 25. This is the number most frequently used in economic 
studies. Although most often used by economists, this single number has only limited 
information content. It not only obscures the distribution across educational categories but 
also hides inter-cohort changes such as the significant improvement in the educational level of 
younger Iranian women. Having the full matrix available significantly expands the possibility 
for analysis not only along the age dimension but also with respect to different mixes of 
primary, secondary and tertiary education in the population. 
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Table 1.  Results of the reconstructions and projections of the population by age, sex and level of educational attainment plus mean years of 
schooling (MYS), Iran, 1970, 2000 and 2030 (in thousands). Sources: Lutz et al. (2007); KC et al. (2008). 
 
Age groups Males  Females 
 No education Primary Secondary Tertiary MYS  No education Primary Secondary Tertiary MYS 
In 1970            
15-19 360.9 585.3 627.8 0.0 6.1  703.3 478.1 303.9 0.0 3.7 
20-24 380.5 492.6 368.2 28.3 5.3  732.7 328.9 163.0 8.2 2.8 
25-29 375.3 358.9 180.6 51.2 4.7  648.5 202.4 76.4 12.3 2.1 
30-34 407.7 268.6 84.2 41.7 3.6  612.8 124.5 34.2 8.0 1.4 
35-39 446.4 191.1 44.6 22.6 2.5  586.5 75.0 16.9 3.7 0.9 
40-44 416.2 152.1 30.3 14.5 2.1  520.8 54.5 12.5 2.0 0.7 
45-49 384.7 119.2 20.1 9.0 1.7  461.3 39.4 8.9 1.0 0.6 
50-54 344.8 89.9 12.8 5.3 1.4  401.5 27.8 6.2 0.5 0.5 
55-59 295.7 64.5 7.7 3.0 1.2  343.3 19.3 4.1 0.3 0.4 
60-64 252.5 45.9 4.6 1.6 0.9  293.2 13.3 2.8 0.1 0.3 
65+ 440.9 58.3 4.4 1.4 0.7  521.2 16.4 3.1 0.1 0.2 
15+ 4105.6 2426.6 1385.5 178.6 3.6  5825.1 1379.5 632.1 36.2 1.8 
25+ 3364.2 1348.6 389.4 150.3 2.5  4389.1 572.5 165.1 28.1 1.0 
In 2000            
15-19 119.3 726.3 3702.1 0.0 8.7  209.6 1059.4 3073.0 0.0 8.0 
20-24 133.1 835.0 2032.3 495.5 9.1  248.6 1166.8 1529.4 396.1 7.9 
25-29 148.0 765.5 1283.5 369.2 8.6  317.8 972.6 979.6 236.2 7.0 
30-34 181.6 643.6 1113.0 268.1 8.2  416.2 809.2 806.6 138.5 6.2 
35-39 231.5 558.5 969.7 234.4 7.9  508.0 643.4 643.8 110.9 5.6 
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40-44 301.7 557.9 680.9 191.7 7.3  603.6 562.5 410.1 74.5 4.8 
45-49 302.4 498.5 390.3 163.7 6.9  659.7 455.3 236.0 62.7 4.0 
50-54 268.5 354.6 200.8 97.9 6.0  636.8 290.9 122.7 34.5 3.0 
55-59 263.6 258.2 116.6 60.1 5.0  513.7 163.5 58.9 16.0 2.2 
60-64 315.9 214.4 71.1 37.0 3.8  493.5 102.6 29.5 7.2 1.4 
65+ 1009.8 386.9 86.3 45.4 2.3  1239.6 135.9 33.2 6.2 0.8 
15+ 3275.3 5799.4 10646.6 1963.0 7.6  5846.9 6362.0 7922.7 1082.9 5.8 
25+ 3022.9 4238.0 4912.2 1467.5 6.8  5388.7 4135.9 3320.3 686.8 4.6 
In 2030            
15-19 9.3 381.0 3373.8 0.0 9.3  5.9 422.6 3168.6 0.0 9.2 
20-24 15.1 416.3 2330.8 777.3 10.8  13.6 488.2 2298.0 589.2 10.3 
25-29 20.2 405.1 1956.9 615.0 10.5  23.0 498.3 1910.3 444.4 9.9 
30-34 28.4 435.0 1821.5 540.9 10.3  37.9 556.4 1569.7 549.8 10.0 
35-39 56.5 690.2 2513.9 708.4 10.0  85.1 911.4 2093.1 720.7 9.6 
40-44 84.3 844.1 2681.8 720.1 9.9  139.5 1148.5 2144.3 735.3 9.4 
45-49 108.5 913.5 2538.4 652.7 10.2  194.9 1283.9 1937.7 672.9 9.4 
50-54 117.5 745.6 1848.8 458.5 10.1  226.9 1073.5 1324.8 476.5 9.0 
55-59 124.0 652.8 1156.1 303.7 9.4  282.1 874.0 793.2 327.7 8.1 
60-64 139.6 508.7 923.3 231.5 9.2  354.8 702.8 723.4 127.6 7.0 
65+ 534.3 1053.3 1452.3 468.5 8.3  1543.6 1362.0 1113.5 236.2 5.3 
15+ 1237.6 7045.7 22597.6 5476.6 9.9  2907.4 9321.6 19076.6 4880.1 8.9 
25+ 1213.2 6248.3 16893.0 4699.3 9.8  2887.8 8410.7 13610.0 4291.0 8.6 
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The methods of multi-state population dynamics can also be used to 
simultaneously project a population by different levels of educational attainment. 
Unlike for the case of multi-state reconstructions, where differential fertility need not be 
of concern because cohort sizes are empirically given, for the projections one needs to 
make assumptions about the future trends in education-specific fertility rates. In the 
context of the global education projections produced by IIASA (KC et al. 2008), this is 
done by assuming overall fertility levels together with constant relative fertility 
differentials among education groups. For these projections several alternative scenarios 
were defined both with respect to the future overall levels of fertility as well as for the 
future educational transition rates from lower to higher educational categories. In the 
following illustrations for Iran we will focus only on the so-called “UN Scenario” which 
defines education-specific fertility and mortality rates in such a way that it replicates the 
overall fertility and mortality rates of the medium variant of the UN population 
projections. This implies that the education pyramid given in Figure 3 has an identical 
overall shape to the one resulting from the UN medium variant, and only the age- and 
sex-specific proportions with different levels of educational attainment have been added 
as additional pieces of information. For the age- and sex-specific probabilities of 
transitions to higher educational categories, the projections presented here follow the so-
called global education trend (GT) scenario. This scenario assumes that over the coming 
years every country follows the trend that has been observed by all 120 countries over 
the past two decades. This is done separately for primary, secondary and tertiary 
education with each country starting the future trend for its young cohorts from its 
current position and then following the average trends of the countries that are already 
somewhat more advanced in their education process. 
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Figure 3.  Projected age and education pyramid for Iran, 2030. 
Figure 3 conveys the educational structure of a highly developed industrialized 
country for Iran in 2030, with high proportions of the population having secondary or 
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higher education. Particularly among younger adults in 2030 there will be virtually no 
uneducated persons left and only a few will remain with primary school as their highest 
attainment (see also Table 1). The overall shape of the age pyramid is rather unusual as 
a consequence of the very large cohorts that were born in the 1980s and who will be 40-
50 years old in 2030. This big cohort will dominate the age structure of Iran for the 
decades to come. Actually, the reduction in cohort size will make it more likely for the 
young generation in Iran to receive more education than implied by the GT scenario, 
which is only defined in terms of proportions and does not consider the changing 
relative size of the youngest cohorts. 
But cohort size can be assumed to matter for school enrolment rates. Due to still 
very high fertility, some African countries will have serious problems in even 
maintaining current school enrolment sizes. As the school age population increases 
rapidly, it will be even more challenging to expand enrolment rates according to the GT 
scenario. For Iran, however, the picture looks very different. Once the larger absolute 
number of children of the huge cohorts born during the 1980s has gone through school, 
the number of school age children will decline rapidly as a consequence of low fertility 
together with declining numbers of potential mothers. In all likelihood, this will result in 
significant further improvements of the numbers of children with secondary and in 
particular tertiary education. Hence, the projection presented here is likely to be an 
underestimation of future educational attainment in Iran. Depending on the level of 
fertility in the near future this decline in the school age population will be followed by 
some echo effect of children born to the large cohorts. 
3  Education and the World’s Most Rapid Fertility Decline 
In demography it is very common to associate changes in the education levels of women 
with changes in fertility levels. It is so conventional, in fact, that education plays a role 
in almost all theoretical approaches to the fertility transition. Education is said to 
provide access to modern ways of thinking, to provide the confidence to engage in the 
modern world, to reduce infant and child mortality, to stimulate higher levels of gender 
equity within couple relationships, and to promote labor force participation of women in 
the cash economy, hence raising the opportunity cost of having children. The education 
of women may also lead to a greater emphasis on their part on the ‘quality’ of children 
as opposed to the quantity of children. Finally, education is a broad indicator of societal 
modernization (Lucas and Meyer 1994; Kasarda et al. 1986). According to Cochrane 
(1979), women’s education is likely to raise the age at marriage and, in some countries, 
to reduce the probability of ever marrying. Cochrane (1979) noted that education is 
positively related to more favorable attitudes towards birth control, a greater knowledge 
of contraception, and husband-wife communication. Caldwell (1982) stated that 
education influences fertility by a) reducing the benefits from children’s work, b) 
increasing the costs of children, c) increasing the importance of the investment nature of 
children, d) speeding cultural change, and e) propagating Western middle-class values. 
As education levels increase, the educated woman is very likely to be married to an 
educated man and to be living in an educated society. This factor also seems to be 
particularly relevant for Iran (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2003). 
Education can be divided broadly into formal (through schooling) and informal 
(acquiring knowledge from various sources, including media, face to face contacts, etc). 
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In Iran one of the main social changes in the 20th century and particularly over the past 
three decades has been the expansion of mass (formal) education. The literacy rate has 
increased dramatically in both urban and rural areas (Table 2). For example, the literacy 
rate for women aged 15-19 in urban areas increased from around 57 percent in 1966 to 
around 97 percent (almost universal) in 1996. The improvement in rural areas has been 
even more dramatic, increasing from only 5 percent in 1966 to 86 percent in 1996. In 
2006, around 98 percent of the women aged 20-24 and 96 percent of the women aged 
25-29 in urban areas were literate as compared to 90 and 84 percent in rural areas, 
respectively. 
 
Table 2.  The literacy rate for women aged 15-19 to 25-29, Iran, by rural and urban 
areas. Sources: Statistical Centre of Iran; various censuses. 
Age 
groups 
1966 1976 1986 1996 2006 
 Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
15-19 57.7 5.4 75.4 19.8 85.8 53.0 96.9 86.4 98.3 93.2
20-24 41.2 2.7 59.4 10.1 75.8 36.5 93.8 77.9 97.9 90.5
25-29 29.5 1.4 49.4 4.9 65.5 22.0 89.5 65.4 96.3 84.1
 
 
In 1998, around 52 percent of those admitted to government universities were 
girls. The figure increased to 57 percent in 1999 and then to around 65 percent in 2007. 
These increases in educational attainment for Iranian girls mean that marriage and 
childbearing are often delayed. Studies suggest that aspirations and expectations of 
women in post-revolutionary Iran have also risen considerably (Shadi-Talab 2005; 
Abdollahyan 2004; Mir-Hosseini 2002; Kian-Thiebaut 2002). This has led to the 
improvement of the status of women at least within the family, and women have 
increased their role in family decision making. Increased literacy has contributed to 
women’s confidence and has increased women’s perceptions that they have options in 
many aspects of their lives, particularly women in rural areas who had been much 
constrained by past gender inequities (Hoodfar 1996). Maternal education has also 
contributed to the reduction of infant mortality (Caldwell 1989; Cleland 1990), a factor 
which is conducive to higher child survival, and thus, reduces the demand for children. 
In addition to formal schooling, informal education and knowledge transmission 
have indirectly contributed to the reduction of fertility in Iran. The legitimization of 
family planning in post-revolutionary Iran paved the way for printing family planning 
brochures, teaching population education in high schools, holding workshops for young 
couples and other educational campaigns by the mass media. By 1996, the majority of 
rural communities had access to piped water, electricity, TV and radio (Abbasi-Shavazi 
2000), thus providing them with more information to increase their knowledge. The 
Literacy Movement was an organization created after the Revolution that aimed to 
instruct all illiterates above 10 years of age. The organization began its task in 1979 by 
dispatching volunteer school graduates as teachers to the villages. There were also 
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classes to instruct illiterate employees under 50 working in government offices, 
factories and workshops. The establishment of a health network system and health 
houses in rural areas diffused the idea of small family size and family planning. The 
system employed local men and women as health officers, Behvarz, who have had 
regular face-to-face contacts with women of childbearing ages to provide them with 
family planning information and services. The compulsory pre-marriage counseling was 
another way by which newly married couples have been able to gain information on 
contraceptives, STDs, and other issues related to maternal and child health care 
(Hosseini-Chavoshi 2007; Salehi-Isfahani et al. 2009). In this paper, our main focus is 
on the impact of formal education and the expansion of schooling on fertility decline in 
Iran. 
Studies reveal that the changes in fertility in Iran during the late 1960s and early 
1970s have been small. The TFR decreased from above 7.0 in 1966 (Amani 1970, 1996; 
Aghajanian and Mehryar 1999; Ladier-Fouladi 1997) to around 6.5 in 1976 (Mirzaie 
2005). Due to socio-political changes as well as the revolutionary protests during the 
years preceding the 1979 Islamic Revolution, like many other government activities, the 
family planning program became inactive during the years 1977 to 1979. The TFR rose 
to 7.0 by 1980. However, Iran has experienced a phenomenal fall in fertility since the 
mid-1980s. The TFR declined from 7.0 in 1980 to around 5.6 in 1988. The decline of 
fertility was slow until the new family planning program was officially inaugurated in 
1989. The TFR fell sharply as of that time, dropping from around 5.6 in 1988 to around 
2.8 in 1996, and to 2.2 in 2000 (Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald 2006). Recent estimates 
of fertility indicate that the TFR declined to around 1.9 in 2006 (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 
Forthcoming). 
The sharp fall of fertility in Iran since the mid-1980s deserves international 
attention. That the decline occurred in an Islamic country is remarkable, particularly 
considering the socio-political context in Iran during and after the Islamic Revolution. 
Indeed, the decline of fertility (after the rise during the 1979 Islamic Revolution) started 
in the mid-1980s when there was no population or family planning policy. However, the 
decline accelerated with the reinstatement of the family planning program in 1989. 
The similarity of the transition in both urban and rural areas is one of the main 
features of the fertility transition in Iran. There was a considerable gap between the 
fertility in rural and urban areas, but the TFR in both rural and urban areas continued to 
decline by the mid-1990s, and the gap has narrowed substantially. In 1980, the TFR in 
rural areas was 8.4 while that of urban areas was 5.6. In other words, there was a gap of 
2.8 children between rural and urban areas. In 2006, the TFR in rural and urban areas 
was 2.1 and 1.8, respectively (a difference of only 0.3 children). 
In addition to the direct impacts of (strictly voluntary) family planning services, 
government policies, such as the extension of public education particularly for girls, the 
establishment of the health network system (Salehi-Isfahani et al. 2009), and the 
increase in access to electricity and safe water, transport and communication in remote 
areas of Iran, most likely had an indirect effect on fertility decline. Abbasi-Shavazi and 
McDonald (2006) have suggested that education has been an important factor in fertility 
decline in Iran. The advancement of female education has affected the delay of marriage 
and childbearing. High aspirations and investments by families in their children’s 
schooling are also likely to have affected couples’ fertility decision making. Abbasi-
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Shavazi et al. (2008a) recently conducted a comprehensive study on the role of 
education on the Iranian fertility decline from which this section partly draws. 
Data on fertility differentials by education in the 1970s are limited. The Iran 
Fertility Survey (IFS) is one of the main studies that provide information on fertility and 
childbearing in the 1970s (see Aghajanian et al. 1992). The IFS results indicate that 
there were educational differences in all age groups (Agha 1985). For example, of 
women aged 25-34, illiterate women had considerably higher children ever born (4.6) 
than women with other levels of education: primary (3.6), secondary (2.2), and diploma 
and higher (1.3). In the same age group, there was a significant gap (3.3 children) 
between illiterate women and those with diploma and higher. On average women aged 
35-39 had around 6.3 children ever born at the time of the 1976 IFS. As will be 
discussed below, the IDHS shows that educational differences persisted to 2000. 
Illiterate women aged 25-34 had on average 3.7 children, as compared to 1.4 for those 
with diploma and higher education. The results also show that children ever born for all 
levels of education at different age groups decreased from 1976 to 2000, except for 
women aged 35-39 at the latter educational levels (secondary, diploma and higher). This 
is in part due to the educational composition of the population in 2000, as the majority 
of rural women who had higher fertility in the 1970s attained higher levels of education 
by 2000. Although the level of education for the general population has increased, some 
women may have retained aspects of their cultural beliefs about high fertility rather than 
adopting the views of their new educational category. A similar result was found by 
Abbasi-Shavazi et al. (2008b) with regard to the higher prevalence of consanguinity 
among the more educated women in four provinces of Iran. 
In the following we will study age-specific fertility rates and total fertility rates 
for the periods 1986 and 2000 based on the own-children estimates of fertility using the 
Iran Demographic Health Survey (IDHS) (see Ministry of Health and Medical 
Education 2000). Figure 4 shows the trend of total fertility rates from 1986 to 2000 by 
educational categories as well as the trend for Iran as a whole. The results indicate that 
there have been significant differences in fertility by level of education in the mid-
1980s. For example, illiterate women in 1986 had around 7.3 children, while women 
with primary level education had around 6.2 children. The TFR for women with 
secondary and high-school levels of education was around 5.1, while women with 
diploma and higher had on average 3.8 children. On average, illiterate women had 3.5 
children more than those with diploma and higher levels of education. 
Figure 4 illustrates the downward trend for education-specific fertility rates over 
the 1986-2000 period. The pace of decline during the first four years (1986-1989) was 
slow, but it accelerated afterwards due to the revival of the family planning program in 
1989. The decline continued for illiterate women and other educational categories until 
2000, but the level of TFR for women with the highest category of education declined to 
the lowest level in 1997, and there was a slight upward trend during 1997-2000. This 
trend may have partly been due to the tempo effects as women in this category first 
postponed marriage and childbearing to continue their education and then did not 
postpone any further which would reduce the depressing tempo effect and result in a 
recovery of period TFR. By 2000 the gap between the levels of fertility for all 
categories of education narrowed significantly. There was only a difference of 1.2 
children between the TFR for women with diploma and higher (1.8 children) and those 
who were illiterate (3.8 children). The level of TFR for women with secondary and high 
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school (1.9) was relatively similar to that of women with diploma and higher (1.8). 
However, there was a significant gap (0.8) between the TFR for illiterate women and 
those with a primary level of education. But by 2000 illiterate women of reproductive 
age have become a very small and select group, mostly in remote rural areas. 
 
Total country
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
B
irt
hs
 p
er
 
w
o
m
an
Illiterate Primary Secondary Diploma, university Total country
 
Figure 4.  Own-children estimates of TFR by level of education during 1986-2000. The 
figures are estimated from the IDHS using the own-children method. 
The age pattern of fertility by level of education during the three five-year 
periods, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, and 1996-2000, is illustrated in Figure 5. As discussed 
earlier, the level of fertility varied considerably by level of education during the first 
five-year period, but the gap was reduced substantially by the third period. The age 
pattern for women who were illiterate and for those with primary and second levels of 
education was indicative of a relatively early childbearing. The peak of childbearing for 
women of all educational categories except those with diploma and higher was observed 
in age group 20-24, and as expected, women with diploma and higher had a delayed 
childbearing pattern. 
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Figure 5.  Own-children estimates of age-specific fertility rates by level of education 
during the periods 1986-1990, 1991-1995, and 1996-2000. The figures are estimated 
from the IDHS using the own-children method. 
As the analysis above indicates, the astonishing speed of fertility decline in Iran 
has resulted from a combination of a rapid increase in the education of women of 
childbearing ages as well as significant fertility declines within educational categories. 
Abbasi-Shavazi et al. (2008a) attempt to decompose the overall fertility decline and 
assess the relative importance of these two factors. In particular they try to estimate the 
relative strength of two forces: 1) Fertility decline due to behavioral changes of women 
in the same educational group (e.g., decline of fertility among women with tertiary 
education); and 2) fertility decline due to the improving educational composition of the 
population (e.g., an increasing proportion of all women having tertiary education which 
is associated with lower fertility). They do so by conducting a simple counterfactual 
projection from 1980 to 2005. Observed TFR declined from 6.96 in 1980 to 1.90 in 
2005. The decomposition exercise is based on applying the education- and age-specific 
fertility rates (EASFR) of 1980 to the education and age structure of women in 
subsequent years. The latter is based on the reconstructed educational attainment 
structures as described in the previous section. For 1980 this yields by definition the 
same TFR as the empirically given TFR. As a result of applying the 1980 fertility rates 
(EASFR) to a changed education composition of the female population, in 1985 the 
TFR yields a somewhat lower overall TFR of 6.57 because there are already more 
educated women who have lower fertility. Continuing this exercise to the year 2005 
yields a TFR of 5.16 resulting from an application of the constant 1980 EASFs to the 
education structure of women in 2005. This implies that a TFR decline of 1.80 (6.96 – 
5.16) can be attributed exclusively to the improving educational composition of the 
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female population. Since the TFR actually declined by 5.06 (from 6.96 to 1.90), the rest 
of the decline must be due to declines in education-specific fertility rates. Since 1.80 is 
36 percent of 5.06, one can conclude that under this approach a bit more than one-third 
of the total fertility decline has been due to improvements in female education, and less 
than two-thirds due to fertility declines within groups of the same educational 
attainment. 
But the two-thirds of fertility decline that cannot be directly explained by the 
changing relative sizes of the four educational categories can in part be related to other 
aspects of education. First, even in terms of formal education, within each of the four 
categories, women improved their average education over time (higher mean years of 
schooling per category) which is likely to be associated with lower fertility and is not 
reflected in the decomposition described above. Second and more important, there are 
many channels of informal education and learning that contribute to value changes, 
changes in desired family size, more information and better access to family planning, 
and hence, directly or indirectly contribute to fertility decline. There is also reason to 
assume that the declining overall level of fertility, which is a consequence of improving 
education, also changes the fertility norms within the lower educational categories. 
These more indirect education effects are difficult to disentangle from the effects of 
improved family planning and reproductive health services. But in sum, there is no 
doubt that the world’s record fertility decline in Iran was due to the combined and 
mutually reinforcing effects of rapidly increasing female education and the most 
efficient delivery of reproductive health services in a country considered to be one of 
the most pronouncedly Islamic in the world. 
4  Global Trends in Education, Fertility Decline and Democracy 
In this section we will return to the global level and statistically analyze on the basis of 
time series for 115 countries for the period 1970-2000 the association between 
improvements in male and female education, recent fertility declines and selected other 
socio-economic variables on the one hand, and improvements in quantitative indicators 
of democracy on the other. The democracy variable is the Freedom House index of 
political rights (Freedom House 2006), which summarizes information about the 
electoral system, political participation, corruption and accountability of the 
government. The original variable has seven categories. We normalized the index to lie 
in the [0,1] interval, with higher values implying more democratic regimes. Of the 120 
countries for which the above described education reconstruction has been done, this 
democracy index is available for 115 for the time period under construction. 
Previous empirical analyses of the effects of education on democracy lend 
support to a positive relationship between these two variables when one exploits 
differences across countries. Barro (1996), Przeworski et al. (2000) and Glaeser et al. 
(2007) are just some examples of panel and cross-country studies that find a positive 
effect of education on the level of democracy by exploiting primarily differences across 
countries. 
Using our data, Figure 6 gives a simple scatterplot showing the average level of 
democracy (as measured by the political rights index) against the mean years of 
schooling from the IIASA data for 115 countries averaged over the period 1970-2000 
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for both variables. It reveals a clear and statistically significant positive relationship in 
which countries with more education tend to have a higher index of political rights. The 
picture is a bit distorted by the fact that a sizeable group of modern democracies is at the 
ceiling of the index at 1.0, which results in the horizontal line at the top. Without this 
ceiling in the democracy data the statistical correlation would be even stronger. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Average years of schooling versus democracy index. 
As to the association between the dynamics of education and democracy within 
countries over time, the empirical findings of previous studies have been more mixed. 
Using a dynamic panel data model estimated using the Arellano-Bond Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) method (Arellano and Bond 1991), Acemoglu et al. 
(2005) do not find any significant effect of education changes on the subsequent level of 
democracy. Bobba and Coviello (2007) criticize the estimation method in Acemoglu et 
al. (2005) and show that changes in education cause changes in democracy using the 
Blundell-Bond “system” GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond 1998) on the same data 
and econometric model as Acemoglu et al. (2005). 
Figure 7 shows the simple bivariate relationship between the deviations from the 
country means in both the education and democracy indicators. Each observation refers 
to a country in a five-year interval for the period 1970-2000. This is a good way of 
depicting the association of the two variables over time within countries. The resulting 
regression line is positively sloped and statistically significant. As shown in Figure 7, 
the horizontal line at zero refers to the democracies that have been at their maximum 
level of 1.0 throughout the period even though their average education continued to 
improve over time. Again, one would assume that without this ceiling effect the positive 
statistical association would be even stronger. But the purpose of these first two 
scatterplots was to simply present the dataset that is being used in terms of descriptive 
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statistics and overall unconditional correlations. In the following we will study the data 
using more sophisticated econometric methods which also take advantage of the age and 
sex distributions of our education data. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Average years of schooling versus democracy index: Deviations from 
country-specific means. 
Moving to multivariate analysis, we first look at a more conventional 
specification of the relationship that does not take advantage of the age and gender 
distribution of education. The basic specification of the simplest model used to analyze 
the link between education and democracy within countries is given by 
,
,1,1,, titititi EdDemDem εθρ ++= −−
                                       (1) 
,
,, tititi
νλμε ++=
                                                          (2) 
where Demi,t is the democracy variable for country i at time t,2  Edi,t is the education 
measure and μi and λt are, respectively, country-specific and fixed time effects. This 
specification has become standard in the recent literature on the education-democracy 
link (see Acemoglu et al. 2005; Bobba and Coviello 2007; or Castelló-Climent 2008). 
The persistent nature of political regimes is modeled through the autoregressive term in 
Eq. (1), and, by controlling for all time invariant country-specific characteristics in Eq. 
(2), we concentrate on the effect of within-country variations of education on 
democracy. The education measure enters the specification in lagged form, so as to 
avoid simultaneity and to further enhance a causal structure between the two variables. 
                                                 
2
 Notice that a period in this specification refers to a five-year interval in our dataset. 
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It is worth noting at this point that the ubiquitous problem of simultaneity is less 
important in the case of studying the effects of improving human capital on economic 
growth, democracy or other longer term returns to education because of a very clear 
temporal sequence of events. Education typically takes place at a young age and it is 
only with a substantial lag of more than a decade (depending on the level of education 
under consideration) that the better educated young adults then enter the labor force and 
can be expected to make a difference in terms of productivity. Hence any change in the 
dependent variable (be it economic growth or democracy) cannot affect the educational 
attainment level of the adult population at that point in time. If improvements in 
democracy should indeed lead to more investments in education, this can at best affect 
the school enrolment rates among children in the current or subsequent period which 
only many years later would affect the attainment level of those above age 25. In the 
case of higher education this lag between investment and possible effect is shorter 
because the age at which people are educated is higher. For this reason we introduced an 
additional lag in the specification of the model as defined in Eq. (2). 
The specification above is a dynamic panel model, which needs to be estimated 
using GMM estimators, since the usual assumption of lack of correlation between the 
regressors and the error term is not fulfilled due to the presence of cross-sectional fixed 
effects. The Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991) uses lagged levels of 
the dependent variable to instrument the endogenous variable in a first-differenced 
version of model (1)-(2). The highly persistent nature of the variables in the model, 
however, makes the Arellano-Bond estimator a suboptimal choice for the estimation of 
the model (see Blundell and Bond 1998). The system-GMM estimator proposed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998) has therefore become the natural technique to estimate the 
model above (see Bobba and Coviello 2007; Castelló-Climent 2008). 
The results in Table 3 support the view that increases in educational attainment 
lead to improvements in the quality of democratic institutions concerning political 
rights. We present results based on average years of schooling for an individual above 
15 years of age, as well as individual results for male and female education (also 
aggregated across age groups over 15). The results of this first set of estimations do not 
show significant quantitative differences in the effect of changes in female versus male 
education on changes in democracy. In both cases there is, however, a highly significant 
positive effect of education on the democracy measure. The estimates indicate that, on 
average, an increase of one year of educational attainment leads to an increase of 
roughly 0.05 points in the democracy index. 
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Table 3.  Estimation results: Democracy and average educational attainment. 
 
Ed
 i,t: Average years of 
schooling (male and 
female) 
Ed
 i,t: Average years of 
schooling (male) 
Ed
 i,t: Average years of 
schooling (female) 
Dem i,t-1 0.581***(0.092) 0.580***(0.091) 0.583*** (0.093) 
Ed
 i,t-1 0.048***(0.015) 0.045***(0.011) 0.043*** (0.017) 
Obs. 706 706 706 
Countries 114 114 114 
Period effects Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) p-val. 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) p-val. 0.678 0.459 0.456 
Sargan p-val. 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. Estimation by Generalized Method of Moments system. 
Dependent variable is the Freedom House Political Rights Index defined in the [0,1] interval. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the p-value test statistic for first and second 
order autocorrelation on the disturbances of the first differences equations. Sargan is the p-value of the 
test statistic for the validity of the overidentifying restriction. 
 
In the following we will further expand the analysis to exploit the demographic 
dimension of the education data in order to shed more light on the relationship between 
improving education and democracy. The IIASA-VID dataset described in Section 2 
above allows us to evaluate the differential effect of educational attainment depending 
on its distribution across age groups. We use principal components analysis to reduce 
the dimension of the dataset on the demographic structure of education attainment and 
obtain three interpretable components which can be used in regressions to shed a light 
on the interactions between age, gender and education on the one side and democracy 
on the other. 
The IIASA-VID dataset provides educational attainment measures for five-year 
age groups. Obviously, including all these variables in the specification above would 
lead to an overparametrized model with highly collinear covariates. Simple methods can 
be used in order to reduce the dimension of the dataset, such as principal component 
analysis. 
Let ( )mtimtiftiftifti EdEdEdEdEdX ,60,,20,,60,,25,,20,   ...     ...   =  be a matrix of stacked data 
on average years of education for different age groups and both sexes, where satiEd ,,  
denotes the average years of education of an individual of gender s (f is female, m is 
male) in the age group (a, a+5). Similarly, let Σ = E[(X-E(X))(X-E(X))'] be the 
variance-covariance matrix of X and let ej and lj be the jth eigenvector and jth 
eigenvalue of Σ, respectively. The eigenvectors form an orthogonal basis of the data, 
  21
and by considering them from largest to smallest we can reduce the dimension of the 
data using a projection of the original data on the subspace spanned by the first L 
eigenvectors, XL XX φ+Ξ= '~ , where LΞ  is a matrix formed by the first L eigenvectors of Σ in rows and φX is the sample estimate of E(X). 
Table 4 presents the loadings corresponding to each of the education measures 
for the first three factors estimated on the data of education by age group and gender. 
Table 4 also gives the corresponding eigenvalues and the (cumulative) proportion of the 
total variance explained by the factors. The three first components explain almost 99 
percent of the variance in the original data, and the resulting component loadings can be 
easily interpreted. The first component assigns practically equal weights to all education 
measures by age and gender, and thus will be interpreted as the Total education (TotEd) 
factor, which summarizes overall movements in the full distribution of education across 
age groups and genders. This factor alone explains most of the variance in the dataset, 
mainly due to the importance of cross-country differences in the dispersion of education 
measures in the panel. The second factor, which we will dub the Older age group 
(OldEd) factor, assigns increasingly positive loadings to the older age groups (both for 
males and females) and negative loadings to the younger groups. The factor summarizes 
the developments in the distribution of education attainment across age groups, 
independently of its distribution between genders. It is the third factor that summarizes 
the differences across genders, by assigning positive loadings to female education 
groups and negative loadings to male education groups. We will thus name this 
component the Female education (FemEd) factor. The inclusion of these factors in the 
specification of the democracy index allows us to study the effects of changes in the 
age/gender structure of education in a given country on democratization processes. 
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Table 4.  Principal components and loadings: Years of education dataset. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using these three factors to summarize the age and gender structure of 
educational attainment in a given year, Eq. (3) below gives our main model where the 
first column of Table 5 presents the estimates of the model including the lagged factors 
as explanatory variables. The model which is estimated is thus 
(3) 
 
with the error term defined as in Eq. (2). The factors have been normalized to have unit 
variance, and the model has been estimated using the system GMM estimator. The 
statistics of this basic model do not present any evidence of misspecification and the 
estimated parameters indicate that countries where increases in total education were 
coupled with an asymmetric development in the educational female-male gap favoring 
female education increased the democracy index more than those where the 
development was homogeneous or biased towards male education. The persistent nature 
of political regimes is captured by the significant autoregressive term in the estimated 
models. We also estimated the model using interactions of the factors, but these did not 
 Factor loadings
 First component Second component Third component 
Ed20,m 0.2256 -0.3803 -0.0863 
Ed25,m 0.2318 -0.3209 -0.1122 
Ed30,m 0.2356 -0.2584 -0.1441 
Ed35,m 0.2385 -0.1808 -0.1866 
Ed40,m 0.2402 -0.0889 -0.2356 
Ed45,m 0.2406 0.0119 -0.2829 
Ed50,m 0.2395 0.1108 -0.311 
Ed55,m 0.237 0.1974 -0.3241 
Ed60,m 0.2332 0.2681 -0.3244 
Ed20,f 0.232 -0.2905 0.2718 
Ed25,f 0.2371 -0.2029 0.2844 
Ed30,f 0.2395 -0.1144 0.2847 
Ed35,f 0.2406 -0.019 0.2702 
Ed40,f 0.2403 0.0826 0.2455 
Ed45,f 0.2386 0.1837 0.214 
Ed50,f 0.2353 0.2719 0.1818 
Ed55,f 0.2309 0.3411 0.146 
Ed60,f 0.2255 0.3897 0.112 
Eigenvalue 16.874 0.7553 0.1690 
% exp. var. 0.9374 0.9794 0.9888 
Std. dev. 4.1078 0.8691 0.4112 
Min. -7.4393 -2.7521 -1.0796 
Max. 8.6385 1.9811 1.115 
,
,1,31,21,11,, titititititi FemEdOldEdTotEdDemDem εθθθρ ++++= −−−−
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appear significant, while not affecting the estimates of the linear part of the 
specification.3 
The rest of Table 5 presents the estimates of specifications for which other 
potential determinants of democracy are controlled. We alternatively control for GDP 
per capita (GDPpc), the investment rate (Inv), life expectancy (LifeExp), the 
urbanization rate (Urb), the share of agricultural output on total output (Agric), and the 
change in the young-age dependency ratio (ΔAgeDep). 
 
Table 5.  Estimation results: Democracy and education. 
Dem i,t-1 0.553*** (0.0810) 0.519*** (0.0779) 0.542*** (0.0690) 0.613*** (0.0645) 0.535*** (0.0773) 0.551*** (0.0773) 0.546***(0.0746)
TotEd
 i,t-1 0.0959*** (0.0198) 0.111*** (0.0223) 0.0952*** (0.0207) 0.0941*** (0.0332) 0.0399 (0.0331) 0.0946*** (0.0199) 0.0882***(0.0201) 
OldEd
 i,t-1 0.0178 (0.0118) 0.015 (0.0112) 0.0291** (0.0123) 0.0219* (0.0122) 0.0351** (0.0170) 0.0204* (0.0120) 0.0259**(0.0127) 
FemEd
 i,t-1 0.0570** (0.0234) 0.0526** (0.0218) 0.0468** (0.0220) 0.0581*** (0.0203) 0.0488** (0.0245) 0.0648*** (0.0219) 0.0798***(0.0245) 
GDPpc
 i,t-1 — 0.00763 (0.0182) — — — — — 
Inv
 i,t-1 — — 0.342* (0.197) — — — — 
LifeExp
 i,t-1 — — — 0.0607 (0.282) — — — 
Urban
 i,t-1 — — — — 0.388* (0.199) — — 
Agric
 i,t-1 — — — — — -0.0335 (0.134) — ΔAgeDep
 i,t — — — — — — -0.0063**(0.0027) 
Intercept 0.240*** (0.0475) 0.191 (0.121) 0.205*** (0.0528) 0.161 (0.187) 0.0705 (0.108) 0.237*** (0.0765) 0.200***(0.0508) 
Obs. 706 574 615 630 706 692 705 
Countries 114 112 114 114 114 112 114 
Period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) p-val. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) p-val. 0.713 0.682 0.562 0.873 0.767 0.746 0.725 
Sargan p-val. 0.273 0.137 0.093 0.002 0.313 0.478 0.030 
 
*[**] (***) indicates significance at the 10 percent [5 percent] (1 percent) level. Estimation by 
Generalized Method of Moments system. Dependent variable is the Freedom House Political Rights 
Index defined in the [0,1] interval. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The educational-demographic 
factors are normalized to have mean zero and unit variance. AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the p-value test 
statistic for first and second order autocorrelation on the disturbances of the first differences equations. 
Sargan is the p-value of the test statistic for the validity of the overidentifying restriction. 
 
 
The different estimated models presented in Table 5 confirm the earlier results 
concerning the effect of changes in the total and female education factor in the basic 
specification. Total education levels and the level of female education relative to male 
education are consistently highly significant drivers of improvements in democracy. 
This is a very important finding in terms of its general political implications. It lends 
convincing statistical support to the hypothesis that improving education is a key driver 
of democratization around the world. High education is not necessarily a sufficient 
reason for democratization, but it makes a higher degree of democratic rights 
statistically much more likely. It is equally noteworthy that female education in 
particular plays a key role in changes toward more democracy. There seems to be 
something about the role of women in shaping basic socio-political attitudes and 
                                                 
3
 The results are available from the authors upon request. 
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enabling societies for more civil liberties that makes their improving education 
particularly important for democracy. These highly significant and quantitative findings 
suggest the need for more qualitative research about the precise mechanisms of the 
specific female contribution to democratization. 
With respect to the age dimension, the factor measuring the old-young education 
differential appears to be positively related to democratization, indicating that countries 
where the older cohorts tend to become more educated than the younger ones, increase 
their democracy index more than those dominated by higher differential education 
increases in young age groups. This is a plausible finding in terms of the fact that 
politically decisive elites in almost every country are predominantly above the age of 
40-45, which is the cut-off point as indicated by Table 4. Hence the findings show that a 
rapid improvement of the average education of this age group is particularly relevant for 
successful moves towards more democracy. From a pro-democracy perspective, this is 
good news for countries that have a longer tradition of investing in education and 
implies that in countries where the education expansion is more recent, one may have to 
wait a little longer for the better educated cohorts to reach the ages over 40-45. This is 
in interesting contrast to the findings with respect to economic growth (see Lutz et al. 
2008) where it is primarily the rapid increase of the better-educated young adults that 
makes the difference in developing countries. Hence, this may also imply that some of 
the recent economic star performers from tiny Singapore to giant China, where 
economic growth was clearly driven by the rapidly improving education in the younger 
labor force, may also be on the path to more democracy as the well-educated cohorts 
move to higher ages. This projection is, of course, under the caveat that education is 
only one among several relevant factors, although it might be the most important one in 
the longer run. 
As to the other social and economic factors considered in the further columns of 
Table 5, the most significant and most interesting from a demographic perspective is the 
factor capturing changes in the young-age dependency ratio (last column of Table 5). Its 
negative sign indicates that declines in youth dependency tend to enhance the move 
toward more democracy. In other words, recent fertility declines are a factor that 
independently contributes to democratization even when controlling for the highly 
significant positive effects of all three education factors considered. This seems to imply 
that the demographic bonus resulting from a fertility decline (Bloom et al. 2000) exists 
not only with respect to enhancing economic growth. It may also be a bonus in terms of 
enhancing democracy. 
Finally, with respect to the other social and economic factors considered in 
Table 5, the most significant result is that they are not significant. While the investment 
rate and urbanization have some weakly significant positive effects, the favorite 
democracy determinant of many economists, GDP per capita, turns out to be entirely 
insignificant after controlling for education. This also suggests that studies that claim to 
find an effect of income on democracy may actually be picking up the effect of 
education which is the more important underlying driver. 
To further test the robustness of our empirical findings we repeated the entire 
estimation using a different democracy indicator, namely the combined polity score 
(Polity2 indicator) sourced from the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2005). The 
results with respect to this very different independent measurement of democracy were 
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stunningly similar concerning the effect of the education factors as presented in Table 5. 
Further robustness exercises were carried out using alternative specifications concerning 
the choice of covariates. The results in all cases reinforce the evidence concerning the 
fact that, after controlling for other economic and demographic variables, general 
improvements in educational attainment and in particular, those reducing the 
female/male attainment gap, precede democratization processes in this most 
comprehensive empirical panel of 115 countries since 1970. 
5  Outlook, Summary and Discussion: Female Education, 
Fertility Decline and Future Democracy in Iran 
In this concluding section we will make a bold attempt at applying the estimates 
described above with regard to the effects of education and demographic factors on 
democratization to make a probabilistic statement about the likely future of democracy 
in Iran. These projections are based on an application of the estimated model parameters 
to the population projections by age, sex and level of education for Iran (as described in 
Section 2 above) and are given in Figure 8. It shows a significant upward trend of the 
projection line as well as of the lines giving two standard deviations up and down. In 
other words, this projection indicates that there is a high probability that Iran will soon 
see significant increases in its political rights indicator. 
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Figure 8.  Political Rights Index in Iran, data and projection. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran is considered one of the world’s most pronounced 
Islamic states, yet over recent years it has seen massive improvements in female 
education and its fertility rate has declined from 7.0 children in 1980 to 1.9 today. This 
world record in fertility decline together with the emphasis on female education and the 
resulting modernization of gender roles – so far still mostly restricted to the private 
sphere – challenges many stereotypes about the effects of different religions on fertility 
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and the status of women. Moreover, if the collective experience of countries around the 
world over the past 35 years is any guidance, these social transformations and in 
particular the strong increase in female education in Iran are powerful forces towards 
more democratic rights in the future. How could this happen and how can we arrive at 
such a conclusion? 
After the Islamic revolution in 1979 one of the changes implemented by the new 
religious leadership of the country was to disband the modest beginnings of a modern 
family planning system. Particularly due to the taxing war with Iraq there was a strong 
sense that many young men were needed for the country. As a consequence the fertility 
rate that already had declined slightly from 7.0 in 1966 to 6.5 in 1976 went back up to 
around 7.0 in the early 1980s. It is remarkable that even urban fertility was close to 6.0 
children during those years, with rural fertility being substantially higher. Around 1989 
a major policy reversal took place that remained largely unrecognized in the West. The 
religious leadership was convinced by its expert advisors that after the end of the war 
with Iraq and with massive youth unemployment, lower fertility would be in the interest 
of the country (see Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2002; Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000; 
Aghajanian and Mehryar 1999; Mehryar 2005). In this context it is also important to 
understand that unlike Roman Catholic doctrine, which is strictly anti contraception, 
according to Islamic teachings, couples should only have as many children as they can 
afford (see Musallam 1983). The leadership also recognized that rapid population 
growth endangered the government’s ambitious efforts for universal primary and junior 
secondary education of both boys and girls. What followed was a well planned and 
apparently very efficient integration of – to the best of our knowledge – strictly 
voluntary family planning services into the already existing dense network of local 
health care facilities. 
There are multiple independent empirical confirmations of this breakneck 
fertility decline as well as of the associated rapid increase in education. While the vital 
registration system in Iran tends to be incomplete, the decadal censuses are considered a 
reliable source of information and provided the basis for a consistent reconstruction of 
age-specific fertility rates since 1976 (Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald 2006) and of the 
changing educational composition. Independent surveys, such as the Iran Fertility 
Survey and the Iran Demographic and Health Survey, as well as in-depth surveys (Iran 
Fertility Transition Survey and Iran Low Fertility Survey) in a number of low fertility 
provinces have confirmed this pattern. 
These policy changes coincided with a remarkable increase in the educational 
level of younger women in Iran, particularly in rural areas. While the census of 1976 
shows that only 10 percent of rural women aged 20-24 were literate, this rate increased 
to 37 percent in 1986, 78 percent in 1996 and 91 percent in 2006. Over this period the 
number of women in this age group grew very rapidly – roughly by a factor of three. 
Due to very high past fertility, this expansion in literacy is even more remarkable. It was 
only possible by complementing the expansion of school enrolment with a rare adult 
literacy campaign which began right after the revolution in 1979. 
In terms of formal education, the improvements are no less impressive, 
particularly the increase of young women with secondary and higher education, as 
shown in Figure 1. In 1970 some 260,000 women aged 20-29 had secondary or higher 
education; by 2005 this number had increased more than 18-fold to 4.80 million. By 
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2015 it is expected to increase further to almost 6 million, before the absolute numbers 
of women in this age group start to decline due to the sharp fertility decline described 
above. The proportions of young women with higher education will continue to increase 
substantially. At the lower end of the education spectrum, young women without any 
formal education, who were still the largest category in 1975 comprising more than half 
of all young women, have been steadily declining to a mere 6 percent in 2005. 
In many African and some Arab countries, comparably high levels of population 
growth have resulted in increasing numbers of uneducated women despite efforts to 
improve school enrolment and significant international assistance in this task. Against 
this background, the successful Iranian uphill battle to improve education in spite of 
exploding numbers of youngsters and without international assistance must be viewed 
as a major achievement in human development. 
It is important to note that fertility decline and female education reinforce each 
other: more educated women tend to have fewer children and relatively fewer children 
make it easier to increase enrolment rates. This major transformation in the social 
structure of Iran brought about by the combined forces of a rapidly changing age 
composition due to the precipitous fertility decline and massive improvements in the 
education of both men and women will in all likelihood affect the economic growth 
potential, social and political institutions and – as the results in the previous section 
show – present a force towards more democratic rights. 
Figure 8 presents the historical data on the chosen Freedom House indicator of 
political rights together with projections based on our econometric model. For the past 
15 years, the democracy indicator for Iran has been lower than during the 1980s. Using 
the elasticities implied by the models estimated in the previous section and the 
projections of educational attainment by age group for Iran in the period 2005-2035 as 
presented earlier in this paper, we can statistically project the future development of the 
Political Rights Index. The result is presented in Figure 8 and corresponds to the 
projections based on the simplest estimated model, which specifies the democracy index 
as a function of the past level of democracy and the three educational-demographic 
factors (first column of Table 5). Including the effects of likely future urbanization and 
changes in the youth dependency ratio would even imply a steeper increase. 
The qualitative predictions of the model are clear: the rapid improvement of 
education in Iran is likely to generate powerful forces towards more democratic rights in 
the country. Based on the quantitative analysis presented here there is a high probability 
that over the coming years, Iran will transform naturally into a modern democracy. 
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